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HOMESTEAD TAX EXEMPTION IN FLORIDA
VERNON

.VCLARK*

HISTORY

In what the Supreme Court of Florida considers the greatest benevolence ever shown by the people of any state toward exemption of
homesteads from taxation,' section 7 of article X was added to the
constitution of Florida on November 6, 1934,2 and amended, with more
liberality, on November 8, 1938. The section, is as follows:
Every person who has the legal title or beneficial title in
equity to real property in this State and who resides thereon and
in good faith makes the same his or her permanent home, or the
permanent home of another or others legally and naturally dependent upon said person, shall be entitled to an exemption from
all taxation, except for assessments for special benefits, up to the
assessed valuation of Five Thousand Dollars on the said home and
continguous property, as defined in Article 10, Section 1 of the
Constitution, for the year 1939 and thereafter. Said title may be
held by the entireties, jointly, or in common with others, and said
exemption may be apportioned among such of the owners as
shall reside thereon as their respective interests shall appear, but
no such exemption of more than Five Thousand Dollars shall be
allowed to any one person or on any one dwelling house, nor
shall the amount of the exemption allowed any person exceed the
proportionate assessed valuation based on the interest owned
*A.B.E. 1932, University of Florida; M.A. 1939, New York University; LL.B.
1942, University of Florida; former District Supervisor, Florida Parole Commission;
Professor of Law, University of Florida,
1. Overstreet v. Tubin, 52 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1951). The Court pointed out that
Mississippi and Florida are practically alone in their policies of withdrawing homesteads
as a source of revenue for the support of their local' government, and in states where
the exemption from taxes for other purposes is granted the amount that is allowable
as a maximum is not nearly as great as that of these two states.
2. Section 7, as adopted originally, appeared as follows: "Tl[here shall be exempted
from all taxation, other than special assessments for benefits, to every head of a family
who is a citizen of and resides in the State of Florida, the homestead as defincd in
Article X of the Constitution of the State of Florida up to the valuation of $5,000.00;
provided, however, that the title to said homestead may be vested in such head of a
family or in his lawful wife residing upon such homestead or in both."

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

XIII

by such person. The Legislature may prescribe appropriate and
reasonable laws regulating the manner of establishing the right to
said exemption.'
Presumably, it was necessary to amend the Constitution in order to
make operative this attitude toward taxation of homesteads. By its
operation, this type of property would be placed in a preferred class for
tax purposes which, in the absence of an appropriate change in the
organic law of tile state, apparently would result in violation4 of the
provision requiring equality and uniformity of rates of taxation, as well
as the provision limiting tax exemptions to property used only for
specified purposes.5
The dearth of appellate court constructions of this amendment has
handicapped proper administration of its provisions. Many questions have
arisen concerning its application, and the authorities charged with its
administration have found it necessary to ask legal opinions of the
Attorney General of Florida upon numerous occasions.
While opinions of the Attorney General are only advisory in nature,
they are of unusual importance in this field since, in the absence of a
statute or a court decision clarifying the meaning of the amendment, or
statutes pertaining thereto, a decision of the Attorney General ordinarily
will be followed by the administrative authorities. Consequently, the
opinions may affect many people.
The importance of such opinions warrants their inclusion in this

discussion, but since they are only persuasive authority and should not
be confused with statutory or case law even by arrangement here, they
will be presented in separate paragraphs designated, "Op. Att'y. Gen."
Tim

DETERMINATIVE DATE

A lien for taxes attaches to all
as of January 1 of each year' and
of this date.7 Since the homestead
cerned with real property taxes" it

real property in the State of Florida
such property is assessed annually as
tax exemption amendments are conis apparent that all requirements for

tax exemption of homesteads under these amendments must be met
annually as of the first clay of the year in order to prevent the attachment
of the lien.
STAT. § 192.12 (1957).
FLA,. CoNST. art. IX, § 1,

3. iLA.

4.

Contains the same terminology.

5.Ibid.
6. FiA. STAT. § 192.04 (1957).
7. FLA. STAT. § 193.11(1) (1957).
8.The description of the homestead as contained in FLA. CONST. art. X, sections
I and 7 can hardly warrant the tax exemption being applied to anything but real
property. Since the tax would, in the absence of the exemption be levied against real
property, the imposition could not be classified as an excise; the incidence of an excise
is not property, but rather a privilege or activity.
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Op. Att'y Gen. The tax year of many municipalities, like that of all
Florida counties, coincides with the calendar year. In some cases, however,
the tax year of a municipality begins upon a day other than January 1.
In such a situation the status of the property for municipal tax exemption
purposes is determined as of the day the municipal tax year begins; the
governing date for county tax exemption of the same property is not
altered, however. This date remains January 1.9
PERSONAL REQUIREMEI'S

The present amendment is not as restricted as the original in the
designation of personal qualifications for eligibility for the exemption.
"Every person" meeting title and residence requirements may claim the
exemption. The requirements of family headship and citizenship10 contained in the section adopted in 1934 are not included in the amended
version of 1938.
Op. Att'y Gen. "Every person" means that single persons, minors,
aliens and others who own their permanent places of residence in the state
are qualified to claim the exemption." The applicant need not be a registered
voter 12 nor a citizen of the State or of the United States. Consequently
the Florida statute providing for the filling of a declaration of domicile
and citizenship is of little value in this respect.' 3
A person otherwise qualified for the exemption is entitled to it
regardless of marital status." A married woman who is justifiably and
permanently living apart from her husband may claim the exemption
if she owns the property in question.'5 In such a case the husband, if
otherwise qualified, is also eligible to claim exemption for his separate
homestead.?' Mental incompetency of the owner of the homestead does
not disqualify him for the exemption if the property on which he is

9. 1953 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 220.

10. Smith v. Voight, 158 Fla. 366, 28 So. 2d 426 (1946). The court recognized
that a person was not required to be a citizen of the United States in order to qualify
for the exemption. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 192.15 (1957) in which the statutory form for the
application for the exemption contains a statement that the applicant is a bona fide
citizen of Florida. This statute was passed prior to the present amendment, however.
11.Op. ArT'Y GEN. 057-70 (1957); 1951 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 346; 1949 REP. ATT'Y
GEN. 218. The methods of citation of the opinions of the Attorney General vary due
to the fact that all opinions rendered in 1957 and 1958 are only in letter form. Opinions
rendered prior to 1957 are in bound volumes and the citations have reference to such
volumes. Ina few cases in these footnotes, it was necessary to cite an opinion rendered
prior to 1957 in the fashion employed for citing opinions rendered in 1957 or 1958
because the citation to the bound volume was not available.
12.
13.
14.
15.

1949
FLA.
1946
1951

REP.
STAT.
REP.
REP.

ATT'Y GEN. 284.
§ 222.17 (1957).
ATT'y GEM. 285.
AnT'Y GEN. 346; REP. ATT'Y GEN.

GeN. 449.
16. 1940 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 449.

193;

(1940)

REP. ATT'Y
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residing permanently was purchased from funds of his estate by order
t
of a court.'
PROPERTY INTEREST REQUIREMENTS

Either legal title or beneficial title in equity to real property constituting a homestead in this state is sufficient to warrant exemption;
such title may be held individually, by the entireties, jointly or in common
with others. It is clear, therefore, that the property must be located in
the state of Florida and that the fee simple title is not the only title which
may serve to qualify the holder for the exemption.
The legislature of Florida has made no all-inclusive list of holders
of "legal title or beneficial title in equity" but has provided that this
terminology includes "vendees in possession of real estate' under bon a
fide contracts to purchase when such instruments, under which they claim
title, Are recorded in the office of the clerk of the circuit court where
such properties lie' 1 and "widows residing on real estate by virtue of
dower or other estates therein limited in time by deed, will, jointure,
or settlement."' 19
An unexercised option to purchase contained in a lease is not
sufficient either as a legal or an equitable interest in the real' property
0
involved to warrant granting of the exemption.
In Simpson v. Hirshberg,2' the Supreme Court of Florida was faced
with the interesting situation of the owners of a homestead giving a
sighed deed to an ostensible purchaser with the space in the deed for
the nani s of the grantees left blank, and receiving the entire purchase
price upon the assumption that they were selling the property to such
purchaser. By agreement with this purchaser the owners 'were to live
iii the house until the middle of the following January. Later, the
ostensible purchaser filled in the deed with the names of grantees with
whom she had dealt without the knowledge of the owners and received
payment for the property. The court held that the deed from the owners
tq the ostensible purchaser was- void,- and only the original owners had
sufficient title on January I to qualify for homestead tax exemption.
Op. Att'y Gen.
(a) Beneficial Title - "Beneficial title in equity" refers to a right
or ii tcrest in land which, not having the properties of a legal estate but
merely a right of which courts of equity will take notice, requires the
22
aid of such court to make it available.
17. 1950 REP. Arty GEN. 286.

18. FLA.
19. Ibid.

STAT.

§ 192.14 (1957).

20. Gautier v.Lapof, 91 So. 2d 324 (fla. 1956.)
21. 159 Fli. 15, 30 So. 2d 912 (1957).
22. 1939 REP. ATT'Y eN. 438.

HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
(b) Heir's Interest - An heir who has inherited a part of undivided
real estate has such beneficial title as to entitle him to claim the exemption
23
if he is otherwise qualified.
(c) Life Estate- A life tenant in residence can claim the exemption,
this being true even though he is making monthly payments on his life
estate and there is a right of reversion in the owner of the fee. 24 If a
grantor conveys in fee a parcel of land to a grantee, reserving to himself
a life estate in an undivided half interest and continues to occupy the
dwelling on one half the land, while the grantee occupies a dwelling
on the other half as his permanent home, the grantee owns title to the
entire tract subject only to the life estate; consequently, the grantee may
claim the tax exemption upon the one-half he occupies but not upon
the half occupied by the grantor; the grantor may claim the exemption
25
on the half he occupies.
(d) Remainderman- A remaindernan, although in possession of the
property in which another has a life estate, does not have a title .which
will warrant a claim for the exemption since the remainder interest does
26
not entitle the owner to possession as long as the life interest is outstanding.
There is a possibility that the remainderman may claim the exemption in
some situations by' holding possession through a right conferred on him
27
by the holder of the life estate.
(e) Tenants in common- If two tenants in common own land and
each occupies as a permanent home one-half of their undivided parcel,
each tenant is entitled to a homestead exemption only 'pon the half
interest in -the part 'he occupies, since this is the extent of his ownership
of the property on which he makes his permanent home.2
(f) Contract of sale-The equitable title of a purchaser under a
contract of. sale of real estate is within the purview of the homestead
tax exemption amendment; 29 however, a person who is entitled to the
homestead tax exemption on the first day of January of a tax year who
enters into a contract of sale of his homestead during the tax year does
not lose the exemption for that year. 0 The fact that a contract for the
sale of land has not been recorded does not affect the purchaser's right
to the exemptioriY'
"
23. 1943 REP, Arr'y

GEM. 198.
24. 1952 REP. ATT'r GEN. 360; 1950 REP. ATT"Y GEN. 286.
25. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 055-85 (1955).
26. 1953 REP. ATTY GFN. 314; 1952 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 36; 1951 REP, ATT'Y

GEN. 449.

27. Op.
28.
29.
30.
31.

ATT'I- GEN. 057-98 (1957).
Op. ArT'y GEE. 055-85 (1955).
1951 REP. Arr'Y GEN. 358.
1950 REP. A-r'Y GEN. 288.
1939 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 448.
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(g) Leasehold -A leasehold interest is not equitable ownership, since
the lessor still holds title to the property; consequently, the lessee is not
entitled to the exemption.-' This statement seems to he true of a lease
for a term of years but not of a leasehold for life. A leasehold for a term
of years is considered to be personal property,33 even though it is a longterm lease such as one for 99 years.34 On1 the other hand, a leasehold
for life is considered as a freehold or real property and the exemption can
be granted with reference thereto.?"1
(h) Corporations- Opinions of the Attorney General
have varied with
regard to whether exemption can be granted to shareholders in a non-profit,
mutual-ownership corporation, in which the shares of each represent his
ownership of his residence. At one time the view was expressed that the
exemption could be granted, " ' but later the position was taken that the
members held neither legal nor equitable title since the title was in the
corporation. "6 Both of these positions eventually were qualified by the
recognition of the necessity of carefully examining the. nature of the
corporation and its relation to the shareholders before the question of
whether the exemption could be granted to the shareholders could be
answered. "7 If this examination reveals that in spite of the permanent
residence of the shareholders they do not have legal or equitable title to
the land upon which their residences rest, the exemption cannot be
granted; if they have the requisite ownership they are entitled to the
exemption 38
(i) Partnership- Homestead tax exemption may be claimed if title
to the property is held by the entireties, jointly, or in common with
others; thus a partner may claim a homestead in the partnership property,
subject to the rights of partnership creditors and his co-partners' 9 A
partner is the equitable owner of his share in partnership realty even though
title to the property is taken in the name of one of the partners or in the
name of a third person. 40 A general partner in a limited partnership may
claim tax exemption on partnership realty to the same extent as the
partners in an ordinary partnership; a general partner may hold legal or
equitable title to partnership realty in trust for the other general partners.4 '

32. 1941 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 163; 1939 Re". Arr'r
GN,

33. 1954 Rv,v. ATT'Y CEN. 208; 1953
360.
34. 1951 REP. Ar'y GEN. 278.
34a. 1952 REP. Arr' GENx. 360.
35. 1936 REP. ATT'Y CFN. 61.
36. 1947 REP. ATr'y GEN. 196.
37. 1951 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 348.

38. Ibid.
39. 1952 RE.P. ATr'Y

GEN.

642.

40. 1947 REP, ATT'y GEE. 617.
41. 1952 REP. ATT'v GrE., 642.

CEN. 447.
REP. ATT'Y GEN. 312; 1952

REP. ATT'Y
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A limited partner's interest in a limited partnership is considered to be
personal property and cannot be the basis for a claim for the exemption. 42
(j) Trust-Where the title to realty is held by trustees under a trust
giving the beneficiary the use and occupancy for his lifetime his interest
is considered a freehold, which is sufficient title to qualify for the exemption. 3 The necessary title is not obtained by the occupancy of the realty
by beneficiaries of the income of the property. 44 Neither does a trustee
who also is a beneficiary and who, without authority, occupies the property
have a title that will support a claim for the exemption.' 5 A fortiori, when
a trust instrument expressly declares the interest of the beneficiaries of
real property in trust to be personalty because their rights are limited to
the earnings from the property, they do 'not have a title on which to base
a claim for the exemption even though they are in possession of the
property.463
(k) Entryman -When a war veteran has made entry of lands under
sections 253.35-253.356 of the Florida Statutes for homestead purposes
and is complying with the requirements of such statutes but the time has
not yet elapsed whereby he is entitled to a conveyance of the public lands
upon which he lives, he has insufficient title in the lands to be taxed;
but from the time he completes the statutory requirements until he receives
the conveyance he has an equitable interest in the land which will support
a claim for the exemption. 47 Of course, after the conveyance is made he
has the legal title.
TiE

RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT

The language of the amendment apparently requires the applicant
for exemption to reside upon the property and make it his or her permanent home in all cases, unless the property is the permanent home
of a legal or natural dependent. Apparently the same requirements as to
the nature of the residence will apply, regardless of whether the owner
oi the dependent lives on the property.
Since the first day of January of the tax year is the day as of which
the status of the property for tax exemption purposes is determined, 8 this
also is the day which is all-important from the standpoint of the residence
requirement. This fact was emphasized by the Supreme Court of Florida
when it held owners of homestead property who resided on the property

42. Ibid.

43. 1956 REP.
44. Op. ATT'Y

ATT'Y GEN. 496.
GEN. 057-34 (1957).
45. 1955 REPY ATT'Y GEN. 104,

46. 1951 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 357.
47. 1948 REP. ATT'Y CEN. 365.
48. See note 8 supra.
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on January 1 and considered it their homestead were entitled to the
exemption.evcn though they moved from the property ten days later. 49
(a) Prior Residence
The only legislative effort that has been made to require prior residence
as a pre-requisite to obtaining the exemption failed. In 1951 the legislature
passed a statute requiring a person, otherwise qualified, to prove one year
of legal residence in Florida prior, to being granted the homestead tax
exemption."° This statute was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of Florida' for the following reasons: an expressed or implied provision of the constitution cannot be altered, contracted or enlarged by
legislative enactment; when this statute is applied the class or group of
persons to whom is accorded the right or privilege of exemption becomes
materially restricted and altered by adding a requirement not included
in the constitutional amendment, viz., that a person otherwise qualified
to apply for the exemption under the constitution, in additiofi to meeting
sucfi requirements, also must prov'e legal residence in the State for a period
of one year prior to making application for the exemption.
(b) Abandonment
Property may lose its homestead character if it is abandoned as a
permanent home by the resident owner or his legal or natural dependent
if the property has been a homestead by virtue of the dependent's residence.
Abandonment requires an intent on the part of the resident to leave the
premises permanently."', If this happens before the annual day upon which
the status of the property as homestead or non-homestead becomes fixed it
is obvious the property is not entitled to the exemption.
In one of the first cases5 2 considered by the Florida Supreme Court
concerning the abondonment of the property as homestead property for tax
exemption purposes, the owners were held not to have destroyed the
character of their property as a homestead in spite of the established facts
that they had given a 'deed to the property to a "purchaser," received full
payment iti'December and continued to live on the property until the following January 11 by special arrangement with the "purchaser" because they
49. Simpson v. Hirshberg, 159 Fla. 15, 30 So. 2d 912 (1947).
It is interesting
to note how the court ignored the fact that these same owners were staying in this home
only until a newly-acquired house was available; how such owners could have considered
the property which was held to be exempt as their permaicnt home did not seem to
disturb the court.
50. FLA. STAr. § 192.12 (1951); this statute was repealed by Fla. Laws 1955,
ch. 29615, sec. 7.
51. S arkman v. State, 58 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1952)...
51a. ee the discussion under "Temporary Absence. vs. Abandonment", infra p.
of the text.
52. Simpson v. Hirshberg, 159 Fla. 15, So. 2d 912 (1947).
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could not get immediate possession of another house, which they, had
previously purchased. The deed was held to be void because it was delivered to the "purchaser" with the places provided for the names of
grantees left blank. The court decided that the property as homestead
property had not been abandoned by the owners as of January 1, presumably because the owners had not moved from .the home before that, date.
The fact that the "purchaser" by filling in the names of the grantees and
delivering the deed, legally conveyed the property to new owners on January
8 did not alter this position. The new owners, although ineligible to apply,
were the beneficiaries of tax exemption for more than eleven months,
since the property was homestead property on January 1 and did not lose
its character as such by the fact that it was legally conveyed to them
after this date.
(c) Temporary Absence vs. Abandonment
A Florida statute-" concerning homestead tax exemptions, provides that
"the words 'resident,' 'residence,' 'permanent residence,' 'permanent home'
and those of like import shall not be construed to require continuous physical
residence on the property, but mean only that place which the person
claiming the exemption may rightfully and in good faith call his home
to the exclusion of all other places where he may, from time to time,
reside."
This statute, although passed in 1935, has been applied by the Florida
Supreme Court with reference t6 the 1938 homestead tax'exemption amendment. 4 An owner of a home in Florida who had been granted the exemption
for several years moved out of his home temporarily for the purpose of
renting it from December 1942 until March 1943 for the winter season.
He removed from the house only his necessary personal belongings, left
the home fully furnished, and resided temporarily in another location. The
supreme court was satisfied that the owner was entitled to the exempion
for 1943 since he intended to return to his home after the temporary
absence. The court indicated that temporary absence from the homestead,
regardless of the reason, will no destroy the character of the property as
homestead property as long as there is an intention on the part of the
owner to return and make it his home."' Accordingly, not only does temporary absence fail to destroy the character of homestead property but this
property is determined for homestead tax exemption purposes provided the
temporary absence may include the date on which the character of the
owner intends to return to the property and not to abandon it as his
homestead.
53. FLA. STAT, § 192.14 (1957).
54. City of Jacksonville v. Bailey, 159 Fla. 11, 30 So. 2d-. 529 (1947).
55. Ibid.
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Care must be taken to preserve the right to homestead exemption if
the temporary absence will include the first day of the tax year, however.
The intent to return is of paramount importance and an owner should
make it evident that he is not abandoning the property as homestead property
by his absence.
The supreme court temporarily threw this phase of the law into a
state of confusion in 1950 when it considered the case of McCullough v.
Forbes." In a 4-3 decision the court affirmed the denial of homestead
tax exemption in a case the facts of which are to be gained only from the
written dissent. According to the dissenting opinion, a widow moved out
of her home in order to obtain nursing service. She stored her furniture
in the attic of the home and rented the house on a month to month basis
but did not live in it on January 1, 1949, the year for which she requested
tax exemption. She claimed the property as her home and that she intended
to return as soon as she was able, but was denied the exemption administratively and judicially.
In comparing the written opinion in this case with that of the previously discussed case in which exemption was allowed in spite of temporary
absence, a reconciliation of the two decisions is largely a matter of speculation. The supreme court apparently found this to be true when it considered the decisions in a subsequent case."7 Success was forthcoming, however, but only after a study of the record of the McCullough ease as it
was considered by the lower court. The additional facts revealed by the
examination of this record, together with the facts contained in the dissenting opinion, were considered sufficient to warrant the finding that there
had been a permanent abandonment of the property as homestead property
in spite of the owner's claim of intention to return. The obvious necessity
for the consideration of the trial record by the supreme court in order
to reconcile the two decisions suggests that the majority of the court should
have issued a written opinion in 1950, especially in view of the fact that
clarification of the situation was not made until 1955.
This clarification was only one phase of L'Engle v. Forbes,5s the most
recent and enlightening case considered by the Supreme Court of Florida
concerning the residence requirement for homestead tax exemption. A Naval
Reserve officer found it necessary to leave his Florida home when called
to active duty. He rented the house for the last half of 1952 and the
entire year of 1953. The supreme court held that he was entitled to tax
exemption on his home for the year 1953, since it clearly appeared that
he intended to return to the property and continue to make it his home
when relieved from duty in 1954. In holding that the property had not
56, 47 So. 2d 780 (1950),
57. L'Engle v. Forbes, 81 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1955).

58. Ibid.
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lost its character as homestead property by the temporary absence of the
owner the court cited with approval its previously: accepted position 9
that continuous physical presence on the homestead without interruptiori
is not necessary to prevent abandonment of the property as homestead
property.
In addition, the supreme court indicated in the L'Engle case that the
rule governing abandonment of property as homestead property is the
same as that developed by its judicial pronouncements in cases involving
the constitutional privileges accorded in section one, article ten of the
Florida constitution which exempts homesteads from forced sale, and section
four of article ten, which prohibits the devise of a homestead when the
owner of the homestead has children. The court admitted that it had no
express precedent for assuming this position, but pointed out that in two
prior cases60 it had impliedly accepted this position by citing a case involving
the exemption granted (by section 1) as authority for a decision involving
the character of property for the purpose of homestead tax exemption,
and vice versa.
It seems evident, therefore, that the Florida cases dealing with the
question of abandonment of homestead property under sections 1 and 4
of the constitution of Florida may be considered by analogy when the
same question arises with regard tosection 7, the homestead tax exemption
section. In such cases the Supreme Court of Florida apparently has assumed
the position that temporary absence with an abiding intent to return does
not constitute abandonment of the property as homestead property,
whether the absence is for business, 0 ' pleasure, health or for the benefit
of the family.62
Unfortunately, there still is no method of assuring uniformity of procedure among tax assessors in granting or rejecting applications for tax
exemption in questionable cases. As a practical matter, the county tax
assesor's determination of whether property is a homestead usually is
final; the lack of specific rules to guide the assessor enhances the possibility
of an unfair, result.63
Op. Att'y Gen.
(a) Permanent Home - A "permanent home" is the place where a

person has his true, fixed and permanent home and principal establishment,
and to which whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning, or
in other language, the place in which he has his fixed habitation without
any present intention of moving therefrom, and such claimant must not
59. City of Jacksonville v. Bailey, 159 Fla. 11, 30 So. 2d 529 (1947).
60. [bid; Saint-Gaudens v, Bull, 74 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1954).

61. Lanier v. Lanier, 95 Fla. 522, 116 So. 867 (1928) (Dictum).
62. O'Lesky v. Nicholas, 82 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1955); Read v. Leitir, 80 Fla, 574.
86 So. 425 (1920).
63. See 9 U. FLA. L. Rv.v. 98 (1956).
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have immediately prior thereto or subsequently thereafter, claimed a
homestead tax exemption by virtue of having a permanent home elsewhere."
The character of the house is immaterial if it is in fact a dwelling merely
being suited or intended for such purpose is not sufficient.6 5 No specified
period of residence is necessary in order to acquire a permanent home.
A person who moves from another state into Florida, buys his home
and moves into it in November with the intent to remain permanently
may claim the exemption on the following January 1.66 Also entitled to
the exemption is a citizen and resident of Florida whose spouse is a national
of another country who travels between that country and the United States
on a commercial visa, if the property is considered as their home 7 In rare
situations, exemption may be granted even though permanent residence
has not been accomplished by January 1 of the tax year. A purchaser of
property who was prevented from moving into his newly purchased property
and making his permanent home there on or before January 1 by the refusal
of a tenant to move from the premises due to his right to stay there under
a rent control statute was held to be entitled to the exemption if he
moved into the property after January 1 and made proper application.68
An alien in this country under a temporary visa cannot meet the
requirement of permanent residence. 9 Neither can an equitable owner
under contract of sale if the contract does not give him permissive possession
as an incident thereto. 70 If such equitable owner merely rents the property
from the landlord he is not entitled to the exemption. 7'
(b) Abandonment-A homestead is abandoned by taking up permanent abode at a different place. 2 Renting the homestead to another or
even absence for a long period of time does not necessarily mean the
property has been abandoned as homestead property. 7" Whether abandonient of the homestead has actually occurred is a question of fact in each
case, and while an extended absence does not of itself establish abandonment it may raise a presumption of abandonment sufficient to cast on the
omner the burden of producing satisfactory evidence, beyond his mere
expression of intent to return, that no abandonment has taken place.r 3a
64. 1952 REP. ATT'Y CEN. 347; 1950 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 350; 1949 REP. ATT'Y.
GEN. 218; 1939 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 438.
65. See 1939 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 450.
66. 1941 REP. ATr'Y GEM. 162.
67. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 057-70 (1957).
68. 1947 REP. ATT'v GEN. 195.
69. 1954 REP. Arr'y GEN. 317.
70. 1951 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 358.
71. Ibid.
72. 1947 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 620.
73. Ibid.
73a. Op. Ar-r'v GEm. 058-329 (1958). Earlier in the same year the Attorney
General had assumed the position that temporary absence while holding an official
position for fourteen years was not prima facie evidence of abandonment, even though
the property was rented during that period. Op. ATT'Y GEm. 058-229 (1958). See
also Op s. Arr'v GEM. 046-376 (1946) and 050-214 (1950).
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The rental of. the property during such absence is evidence tending to establish abandonment but such evidence is not- conclusive in itselfTSb
Abandonment of an insane person's homestead may be accomplished
by his legal guardian if the facts clearly show an intent to abondon; evidence
74
of mere rental of the property by the guardian is not sufficient, however.
A woman accomplishes the abandonment of her homestead by leaving
her home to reside permanently with her newly-acquired husband in another
state.7 5 An owner of an urban homestead may abandon it in part by
devoting that part to uses other than for a home or business house.7 6
Temporary absence or removal from the homestead does not destroy its
character as homestead property, since occupancy of the homestead is
deemed to continue. Such absence due to business, pleasure, education of
children, or to look for another home which has resulted in failure will not
be considered an abandonment of the homestead property."
Specific instances of temporary absence wilth the consequent retention
of, the homestead status are the following: a homestead owner who found
it necessary to move to Washington, D. C. as the result of appointment
to federal government service;78 one who became mentally incompetent
and was confined in an institution and whose property was rented for his
benefit;7 a draftee or reservist recalled to military duty; 0 a fireman who
moved his family out of his home to reside in furnished living quarters in
the fire station but who maintained his home and spent his vacations and
off-duty time there..
An owner's voluntarily remaining in the armed services after a tour
of d uty has been served has given rise to conflicting opinions of the Attorney
General. In 1949, the position was taken that reenlistment did not constitute a valid.basis for ineligibility for the exemption,8 2 but a reservation
was cointained therein by the observation that the opinion was based
partially on the necessity of the federal government maintaining armed
forces in foreign countries and that the granting of the exemption in this
case was not to be taken as a general precedent. In 1955, an opinion was
issued to the effect that a person drafted into the armed services who elected
voluntarily to remain in the service upon the expiration of his tour of
duty was voluntarily absent from his home and was not eligible for the
cxemption.8s: Prior to the consideration by the Florida Supreme Court of
73b. Op.

ATT'Y GEN. 058-329 (1958).
REP. ATT'Y GEN. 288.
1948 REP. ATT'Y GN. 279.
Op. ATTY GEN. 057-144 (1957).
1948 REP. ATT'Y GEm. 279.

74. 1950

75,
76.
77.
78. 1950 REP.
79. 1948 REP.
80. 1949

81. 1954
82. 1949
83. 1955

ATT'Y GEN.
ATT'Y GEm.

REP- ATT'Y GEN.

REP. ATT'Y GEN.
REP. Arr'y GEN.

278.
194.
227.

217.
213.

REP. ATT'Y GEN,

91.
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cases in volving the rental of property during the absence of the owner, the
Attorney General was of the opinion that the rental of a home was for a
commercial purpose which has resulted in eligibility for the exemption; 4
on the other hand, a serviceman was allowed to rent his home during his
absence in the service and still remained eligible for the exemption."
LEGAL OR NATURAL DEPENDENT

The only exception to the requirement that the owner of the legal or
beneficial title must reside on the property and in good faith make the
same his or her permanent home is in the case of a legal or natural
dependent of such owner, if such dependent makes the property his or her
permanent home.
No appellate court in Florida, nor even the Attorney General, has
been concerned with the dependent's role in the determination of the
status of the property as homestead property. Presumably, the previous
discussion concerning the establishment and the abandonment of homestead property, wherein the intent of the homesteader was of paramount
importance, would apply also to a dependent in many situations. Whether
it would apply to a dependent minor is problematical. It seems that even
though the dependent minor is of the opinion that the place in which
he resides is not his permanent home, the exemption should not be disallowed as long as he resides there in a state of dependency upon the
owner who applies for the exemption and is not receiving an exemption
elsewhere.
The term "legal or natural dependent" has never been construed on
the appellate level with reference to this amendment. Obviously, a wife
is the legal dependent of her husband, and minor children are the legal
dependents of their father, but such relationships are not the ones most
likely to raise questions under the homestead tax exemption amendment.
Proper analogies probably may be drawn, to a limited extend, with
situations considered by the Supreme Court of Florida having to do with
other provisions of the constitution of Florida and with Florida statutes
which are concerned with dependents.
In resolving questions of whether family headship exists under the provision of the Constitution exempting a homestead owned by a head. of.a
family from forced sale, a widow with dependent minor children 6 and a
wife supporting an incapacitated husband were held to qualify.87 While
84 1941 REP. ATT'y CEN. 164.
85. 1941 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 165.

86. Jetton Lumber Co. v. Hall, 67 Fla. 61, 64 So. 440 (1914); Cf. Matthews v.
Jeacle, 61 Fla. 686, 55 So. 865 (1911). See Jones v. Federal Farm Mtg. Corp., 138
Fla. 65, 188 So. 804 (1939).

87. Bigelow v. Dwnphe, 143 Ha. 603, 197 So. 328; Rehearing denied. 144 Fla

330, 198 So. 13 (1940).
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family headship is not a requirement for homestead tax exemption there
seems to bo no doubt that the minor children are the legal dependents of
their widowed mother. There may be less force in the contention that the
incapacitated husband is the legal dependent of his wife but he certainly
should be considered a natural dependent, at least.
Additional constructions of the constitutional provision concerning
forced sale of a homestead hold that family headships exist in the following
situations: a widow who lives with and supports adult children; 88 a widower
who rears his graddaughter in his home at his own expense after the
death of her mother and departure of her father, even though no formal
adoption takes place;8 9 a grandmother who supports her grandchildren in
her home; 0 a single man supporting his mother and the children of a
deceased sister in his home.' While none of the relationships may be
sufficient to warrant considering the person being supported a legal dependent, the conclusion seems to be logical that each might be properly
classified in the "natural dependent" category.
In construing a statute 2 allowing a civil action to a person "who was
dependent for support upon the person killed" the Supreme Court of
Florida required the plaintiff to show "regardless of any ties of relationship
or strict legal right to support, that he or she was, either from disability
of age, or non-age, physical or mcntal incapacity, coupled with lack of
property means, dependent in fact upon deceased for support. There must
be, when adults claim such dependence, an actual inability to support
themselves, and an actual dependence upon someone else for support, or
with some reasonable claim to support from the deceased." Whether a
Florida appellate court would approve of such a strict concept of dependenecy with relation to homestead tax exemption remains to be seen, but
the necessity of requiring convincing evidence of substantial dependency in
addition to the owner's word that such dependency exists seems obvious.
The constitution does not expressly require the landowner who claims
exemption on the basis of a legal or natural dependent's residence to
live in Florida. Clarification of this point is desirable. Limitation of the
exemption to Florida residents seems preferable on the basis of public
policy being better served by not encouraging the transplanting and/or
abandonment of financial dependents in Florida as well as not allowing
the possibility that a non-resident may be able to obtain, two exemptions
i.e. one in Florida and another in the state in which he resides.
88. Hillsborough v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 13 So. 2d 448 (1943); Davis v. Miami
Beach Bank & Trust Co., 99 Fla. 1282, 128 So. 817 (1930); Caro %.Caro, 45 Fla. 203,
34 So. 309 (1903).
89. Adams v.Adams, 48 Fla. 205, 37 So. 734 (1904).
90. lii]l v. First National Bank of Marianna, 73 Fla. 1092, 75 So. 614 (1917).
91. Ibid.
92. Duval v,Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 So. 876 (1894).
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Op. Att'y Gen. - The phrase "legally or naturally dependent on such
owner" refers to persons to whom the owner is under a legal duty to support,
and to persons related by blood to the owner who are, by reason of disability of age or non-age, physical or mental incapacity, coupled with lack
of property means, dependent in fact for support and who have a reasonable
expectation or reasonable claim for support. 3
Legal obligation for a parent to support an adult child or vice versa,
or for a person to support in-laws did not exist at common law. 9 4 A moral
obligation coupled with actual support is strongly indicative of natural
dependency, but the mere fact that a person is a parent-in-law or an adult
daughter of the landowner does not, as a matter of law, make such person
a natural dependent of the landowner." It is only when a parent, adult
child or other relative is entirely or largely dependent upon the owner for
support that he may be considered as naturally dependent upon the owner."4
If a landowner is granted an exemption for himself anywhere in the
state lie may not obtain another exemption on the basis of his support of
a legal or natural dependent. 7 Only one exemption may be granted per
owner. The Attorney Gexieral applied this principle in a situation in which
a wife owned a parcel of land on which she and her husband made their
permanent home and the husband owned another parcel upon which be
maintained a permanent home for his dependent daughter; the Attorney
General ruled that only one exemption could be claimed. 8 This opinion
seems to be based upon the accumption that the husband had an equitable
interest in the property owned by the wife, and left unanswered the question
of whether, if the husband had no such interest, both were entitled to
exemptions on their individual properties. The refusal of the exemption to
the wife while, at the same time, the husband is granted the exemption
in such a situation would call for a strained interpretation of the language
of the amendment if the property to which the wife held title was truly
her sole property and had not been conveyed to her merely to circumvent
the requirements of the amendment.
If the landowner is a permanent resident of another state he cannot
claim the exemption on the basis of a natural or legal dependent making
his or her permanent home on land he owns in this State, since the policy
upon which the homestead tax exemption is based favors this State's resident
owners .9

An owner of two dwelling houses on land embraced in* his homestead
is entitled to the exemption on all the property if the occupant of the house
93. 1939 REP.
94. 1955 REP.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. 1956 REP.
98. Ibid.

99. Op.

ATT'Y GEN. 438.
ATT'Y GEN. 262.
An'Y GEN.

ATT'Y CEN.

555.

057-90 (1957).
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not occupied by the owner is legally or naturally dependent upon the
owner.'" Of course, the maximum exemption allowable here would be
five thousand dollars.
"ALL TAXATION ExcEPtr.

(a) Extent of Exemption- With the express exception of assessments
for special benefits and the implied exception of taxation for the retirement
of contractual, unretired indebtedness for which land of the jurisdiction
was liable upon the effective date of the pertinent amendment, 10 1 the exemption may be claimed against all taxation up to the assessed valuation of
five thousand dollars.
Such a provision, no doubt, is broad enough to cover exemption from
property taxes by the state, county, municipalities and even taxes of special
tax districts where land is not specially benefitted by the improvement
involved. Since ad valorem taxes for state purposes are now prohibited by
the Constitution of Florida, 0 2 the problems that have arisen involved
taxation by the other subdivisions of the State.
(b) Assessments for Special Benefits - Whether there is real significance
to be attached to the terminology "assessments for special benefits" which
appears in the 1938 amendment and the "special assessments for benefits"
of the 1934 amendment, cannot be answered with certainty. 0 3 The Supreme
Court of Florida has expressly refrained from determining this point'04
but in so far as the 1938 terminology has been construed no difference has
been made to appear 10 5 The theory of the special assessment has been
applied several times with reference to the current amendment. 08
A special assessment differs from a general tax. A tax is an enforced
burden of contribution imposed by sovereign right for the support of the
government, the administration of the law, and to execute the various
functions the sovereign is called on to perform. 0 7 A special assessment
is like a tax in that it is an enforced contribution from the property owner;
it may possess other points of similarity to a tax, but it is inherently
100. 1939 REP.

ATT'Y GEN. 447.
101. See notes 136-139 infra and text pertaining thereto.
102. FLA. CO NST. art. IX, sec. 2 provides, inter alia, that after December 31st, A.D.
1940 no levy of ad varolem taxes on real property shall be made for any state purpose.
103. State ex. rel. Ginsberg v. Drcka, 135 Fla. 463, 185 So. 616 (1938) contains
launguage which seems to imply that benefit to the district as a whole is sufficient
rather than to the land. Contra, Fisher v. Board of County Comm'rs, 84 So. 2d 572
(Fla. 1956); Crowder v. Phillips, 146 Fla. 428 (1941).
104. Fisher v. Board of County Commr's, 84 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1956); City of Fort
Lauderdale v. Carter, 71 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1954), Crowder v. Phillips, 146 Pa. 428
(1941); State v. Henderson, 137 Fla. 666, 188 So. 351 (1939).
105. Ibid; Whisnant v. Stringfellow, 50 So, 2d 885 (1951); Crowder v. Phillips,
146 Fla. 428 (1941).
106. Ibid.
107. Whisnant v. Stringfellow, 50 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1951).
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different and governed by entirely different principles.'" 8 A special assessncnt is imposed upon the theory that the portion of the community
which is required to bear it receives some special or peculiar benefit in the
enhancement of value of the property against which it is imposed as a
result of the improvement made with the proceeds of the special assessmlient. '10"
This theory of the special assessment as explained and accepted by
the supreme court with reference to homestead tax exemption includes
taxes to retire expenses of paving where there are bcnefits accruing to the
property,''" expenses of special drainage districts,' special inland navigation
districts,'1 2 and maintenance costs of special road and bridge districts where
special benefits peculiar to district property can be shown.'"'
Some efforts to have certain taxes classified as assessments for special
benefits have been rebuffed by the Florida Supreme Court. A tax levied
by a city upon all property, real and personal, in the city, the revenues
produced thereby to be used to defray the expenses of garbage, waste and
trash collection was held not to qualify as a special assessment.'' 4 The
court indicated how the theory of a special assessment had been ignored
by stating that no distinction had been made in the levy between occupied
or vacant properties or, if occupied, whether the property was being used
for commercial or residential purposes; the tax was not imposed on a basis
of proportionate relationship to the cost of the service to be rendered to
any particular property, and no special or peculiar benefit resulted to any
specified portion of the comnliuitv or the property situated therein.
A tax by a special improvement district is not a special assessment in
the absence of proof that all property in the district will actually benefit
from the improvcments, for which the tax is levied, in proportion to its
valuation.' "' The mere fact that some property will benefit by the improvement is not sufficient; there must be clear evidence that all property to be
taxed will benefit commensurate with the burden of the tax.'", Taxes by
special districts set up for the construction of a school,"' 7 a county hospital,1X or a county health unit'" arc not special assessments. While each
of these items may be said to generally improve the district in which it
108. Ibid.
109. City of Fort Latdcrdale N. Carter, 71 So. Zd 260 (FIa. 1954).
110. Rafkin v, Miami Beach, 38 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1949).
111. Martin v. Dade Muck Land Co., 95 Fla. 530, 116 So, 449 (1928).
I12. State ex relBoard of Conmiir's of Florida Inland Nay, Dist. v. Lathamn, 121
Fla. 486, 163 So. 890 (1935).
113. State ex relGinsberg v. Drcka 135 Ha, 463, 185 So. 616 (1938).
114, City of Fort Lauderdale v,.
Carter, 71 2d 260 (Fla. 1954).
115. Fisher ,.
Board of County Conrmm'rs of Dade County, 84 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1956).
116. Ibid.
117. State ex relClark v,llenderson, 137 Fla. 666, 188 So. 351 (1939).
118. Crowder v. Phillips. 146 Fla. 428. 1 So. 2d 885 (Via. 19;11
119. \Vhisnant v,Stringfellow, 50 So, 2d 885 (Fll. 1951).
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is present, the test of the special assessment is not satisfied, viz.,0 the improvement of the land commensurate with the burden of the tax."2
Op. Att'y Gen.- The Attorney General, although previously expressing
himself to the contrary,121 is presently of the opinion that the Supreme
Court of Florida may draw a distinction between the "special assessments
for benefits" of the 1934 amendment and the "assessments for special
r This position is based on the following
benefits" of the 1938 amendment.122
12
reasons: In State v. Dreka, a case arising under the 1934 amendment, the
court seemed to indicate that the tax was a special assessment for benefits
if there were benefits accruing to the district by virtue of the improvement,
even though there was no showing of special benefits to lands; whereas, in
cases decided under the 1938 amendment the court has left little doubt
that "assessments for special benefits" is concerned with an assessment
bearing a logical relation to direct special benefits to the land. Consequently,
under the 1938 amendment homesteads are exempt from taxes for the
following purposes: to retire special tax school district bonds issued in
1946;124 to pay the expenses of a mosquito control district;' 25 to pay maintenance costs of a road district;" 06 and to pay for the support of a hospital
district and the hospital located therein.' 7 All of such taxes are considered
as general taxes, not special assessments.
PRIOR OBLIGATIONS

(a) Impairment of Contract-The Constitution of the United States
prohibits a state from passing any law which impairs the obligation of a
contract;" -8s consequently, the homestead tax exemption provision of the
constitution of Florida, if valid, can not be construed to impair such an
obligation."' The result has been the judicial recognition of an additional
exception to the exemption of homesteads from taxation under Section 7.
If, prior to the effective date of the amendment, a debt has been
incurred by a tax jurisdiction and such jurisdiction is bound contractually',"
to retire such debt by imposing a tax upon all of the land in the jurisdiction,'
the operation of section seven does not affect this obligation and the lands
120, See notes 117-119 supra.
121. 1939 REr. ATT'Y CEN. 438; 1939 REP. ArT'Y GN.447.
122. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 057-202 (1957).
123, 135 Fla. 463, 185 So. 616 (1938).
124. 1947 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 616.
125. 1949 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 418, affirmed, Op. ATT'Y GEN. 056-244 (1956).
126. 1947 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 620.
127. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 057-302, (1957).
128. U. S. CONST. art. r, § 10.
129. Groves v. Board of Public Instruction of Manatee County, 109 F. 2d 522 (5th
Cir. 1940). See American Can Co. v. City of Tampa, 152 Fla. 798, 14 So. 2d
203 (1943).
130. Such a debt is to be distinguished from a mere unsecured obligation or an
obligation which may be secured in some fashion not involving a pledge to tax.
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remain taxable for its retirement. 131 Neither homestead tax exemption
amendment, therefore, can relieve the homestead of taxes for the retirement
of the following: bonds which require the taxation of the lands within
the jurisdiction for their retirement, provided such bonds were actually
issued prior to the effective date of the pertinent amendment;3 2 refunding
bonds, even though issued after the effective date of the amendment, provided such bonds refunded obligations issued prior to the effective date
of the amendment; 133 tax participation certificates exchanged for old
evidences of indebtedness binding the lands to taxation for their retirement,
such indebtedness being incurred prior to the effective date of the amendment;1 34 and even judgments obtained against the tax jurisdiction prior to
the operation of the amendment. " 5
(b)Effective Dates-The effective dates of both the 1934 and the
1938 amendments thus become important. If the contractual obligation
was incurred prior to November 6, 1934, the amendment approved on that
date did not disturb this obligation and all lands previously liable to be
taxed for its retirement continued to bear this burden. 3 6
If the obligation arose November 6, 1934, or thereafter but before
January 1, 1939, the effective date of the 1938 amendment, persons who
qualified for the exemption under the 1934 amendment were relieved from
taxation of their homesteads for the retirement of such obligation, as pro
vided by the amendment, since the obligee of such contractual obligation
had constructive notice of the existence of the amendment and consequently the law did not impair the obligation of his contract.18 7
Contractual obligations of the tax jurisdiction arising on or after January
1, 1939, are not to be retired by taxation of lands exempt under the provisions of the amendment effective on that date.'- 8 Again the obligee's
notice, either actual or constructive, of the existence of the amendment
and the possibility that his security for the retirement of the obligation may
be jeopardized by property being exempt from taxation gives him no cause
for valid complaint if the possibility becomes an actuality. 1 9
131. See nate 129 supra and text pertaining thereto.
132. Yowell v.Rogers, 128 Fla.881, 175 So. 772 (1937).
133. Richard v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 146 Fla. 349, I So. 2d 202 (1941); State
v. City of Pensacola, 123 Fla. 331, 166 So. 851 (1936).
134. State v. City of Tarpon Springs, 138 Fla. 649, 190 So. 19 (1939).
135. Groves v. Board of Public Instruction of Manatee County, 109 F. 2d 522
(1940).
136. It is possible, but not probable, that January 1, 1935 may be considered as
the effective date of this amendment, since the tax year of 1934 was practically over
when the people approved the change in the constitution. Th 1938 amendment contained the specific date that it was to first become effective, viz., the 1st day of
January, 1939 which was the beginning of the next tax year after the adoption of the
amendment.

There is no date specified in the 1934 amendment.

137. Crosby & Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, 2 U. PLA. L. Rv. 355 (1949). See
notes 132-135 supra and text pertaining thereto.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
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(c) Date of Qualification - It seems apparent that -if at any time on
or after the effectivedate of the pertinent amendment a person meets the
requirements of the amendment he is qualified to receive the exemption,
e.g., a Chinese national residing with his family of which he is the head,
in his permanent homestead in Florida on and after November 6, 1934,
became a citizen in 1937; he thus was qualified to receive the exemption with
reference to contractual obligations of the jurisdiction's contractual indebtedness incurred after November 6, 1934. A person who becomes an equitable
owner of his homestead on or after January 1, 1939, is entitled to the tax
exemption with reference to the jurisdiction's contractual indebtedness incurred on,,or at any time after, that date, regardless of the fact that the
owner's qdalification post-dated the creation of the obligation. Similarly,
non-homestead property apparently may become homestead property on
or at any time after the effective date of the pertinent amendment and thus
bcome qualified for exemption.
Op. Att'y Gen.
(a) Prior Obligations- The homestead tax exemption amendment protects a homestead from taxation to retire a general fund indebtedness
incurred prior to the effective date of the amendment, since such an indebtedness is not a contractual obligation binding the land.140 Protection is also
afforded against taxes for debt service and interest for bonds of a city,
issued prior to the effective date of the amendment, and levied against
homesteads which were not in the city at the timl- of 'such indebtedness
was incurred. 14 1 The bond contract between the city and the bond holders
is in no way affected by such exemption and is not within the protection
of the contract clause of the federal constitution. 42 The amendment also
warrants exemption from taxation of a building which was erected on land
subject to municipal bonded indebtedness but which was excluded from
the municipal corporate limits by legislative act prior to the erection of
the building. 143 This opinion was not concerned with the taxation of the
land, merely the building.
(b) Effective Date-Taxes for the retirement of bonds issued after
the effective date of the amendment for a county hospital are prohibited
44
under the amendment.
Bond indebtedness does not exist until the bonds are sold and delivered, and although the issuance of bonds is authorized by an election held
prior to the effective date of the amendment, if the bonds are not sold

140. 1941

REP. ATT'Y GEN.

141. 1946 REP.
142. 1953 REP.

143. 1950
144. 1947

ATT'Y GEN.
ATT'Y GEN.

REP. ATT'Y GEN.
REP. ATT'Y CEN.

168.

777.
372.

289.
620.
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until after the effective date of the amendment, the4 homesteads are protected from taxation for the retirement of such bonds.1'
TlE

FIOMEsTEAD

(a) Homestead Defined: - The "home and contiguous real property,
as defined by Article 10, Section 1 of the Constitution," is the type of
property covered by the tax exemption section. This section sets the limits
of a homestead in the following language, "A homestead to the extent of
one hundred and sixty acres of land or the half of one acre within the
limits of any incorporated city or town ..... and the improvements on
the real estate ...... The exemption herein provided for in a city or town
shall not extend to more improvements or buildings than the residence
and business house of the owner ....

"14,

This section of the constitution also provides for an exemption of a
homestead from forced sale under process of court and is not to be confused
with the exemption from taxation under section seven, the tax exemption
section. It is necessary to consider the terminology of both sections in
defining the type of property which is entitled to the tax exemption, i.e.,
a "home and contiguous real property," according to section seven, "to the
extent of one hundred sixty acres of land or the half of one acre within
the limits of any incorporated city or town . . . and the improvements
on the real estate . . . in a city or town shall iot extend to more improve-

ments or buildings than the residence and business house of the owner .. .
according to section 1.
Section 5, article X of the Florida constitution poses a problem with
reference to the area of a homestead under the tax exemption section.
Section 5 provides that "No homestead provided for in section 1 shall be
reduced in area on account of its being subsequently included within the

limits of an incorporated city or town, without the consent of the owner."
Does this apply to homesteads under section 7 also?
If the answer to this question is to be determined by considering
article X only as an entity, an affirmative answer may not be illogical. A
negative answer seems preferablc, however. Reference to section 5 is not
145. 1939 REP. ATTy GFN. 458.
146. Any real estate used and owned as a homestead by an ex-serviceman, honorably
discharged with a service connected disability and classed as a paraplegic or is required
to use a wheel chair for his transportation and who has a certificate from tle government or the United States Veterans' Administration, certifying that he is receiving or has

received special pecuniary assistance due to disability requiring specially adapted housing
is exempt from taxation according to statutes passed in 1957, FA. STAT. §§ 192.111,
192.112. Since there is no maximum limitation concerning the extent of the homestead
in these statutes, they could not be upheld under section 7, article X with relation
to the property exceeding the maximum limits of a homestead tinder that section, but
probably would be upheld under section 1, article X which, inter alia, authorizes the
legislature to exempt property for a charitable purpose without limiting the extent of
the real property that may be involved.

1959]

HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION

expressly included in section 7, which may indicate an intent to limit the
definition of a homestead entitled to tax exemption to section 7 as supplemented only by section 1. In addition, the language of section 5 "No
homestead as provided for in section 1" may be of significance. The term
"provided for" seems more inclusive than merely to denote the area of the
homestead. It seemingly connotes the idea of protection, which is the
purpose of section 1 in so far as homesteads are concerned and such protection is against forced sale, not the imposition of taxes.
Op. Att'y Gen.
The amendment requires that there be a dwelling house upon the
property, in which the owner usually resides. The nature of the structure
constituting the home is immaterial except in so far as it indicates the
intent of the owner to make it his permanent home, 47 A house trailer
may be a permanent home if the owner of the trailer also owns the property
upon which it rests and he intends to reside there permanently.' 4 8 A houseboat which is afloat cannot qualify under the amendment, but probably
may do so if attached permanently to land. 1 "
A homestead includes everything appurtenant to the dwelling which
may be, and is, used for the more perfect enjoyment of the home, but
property cannot be considered appurtenant unless it is used principally
and in good faith for homestead purposes.1 5 A garage may be claimed as
an apurtenance to the home and may be included in the exempt property.' 5'
If a motor court is located on two parcels of land, each parcel being
separately owned, each owner is entitled to the exemption even though
the motor court, excluding the residences of the owners is operated by
2
the parties as a single unit."
Property that was a homestead prior to its being included within the
limits of an incorporated town cannot be reduced in area to meet the
requirement of the maximum of one-half acre generally required of homestead property within incorporated towns. Section 5, article X of the
Florida constitution prohibits such procedure.1 53
(b) Contiguity- Contiguity of the real property to the home was
first made an express requirement in the 1938 amendment. No question
concerning this element has faced the appellate courts of Florida with
regard to either amendment.
147. 1952

REP. ATT'Y GEN. 288.

152. 1955

REP, ATT'Y CEN. 113.

148. ibid.
149. 1948 REP ATT'Y GEN. 195.
150. 1952 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 352.
151. Ibid.
153. Op, ATT'Y

GEN. 057-6 (1957); 1943 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 240; 1941 REv. ATT'Y
GiEN. 164. Note the contrary position taken by the writer of this article.
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"

A homestead must be composed of a contiguous irea of land, 15 4 and
if three parcels are joined only at the corners this is sufficient. 1 6 Contiguous
vacant lots to the lot upon which the dwelling is located in a city, all
not exceeding in area the oneialf of an acre, may be claimed as exempt
property.'" 6 Opinions rendered during the operation of the 1934 amendment,
in which contiguity is assumed T6 be a necessary element, were to the
effect that this element is not lost when the construction of a public road
results in dividing a previously-existing homestead,' 5 but urban lots separated by a public street in existence at the time the lost were purchased
are not contiguous within the meaning of the amendment. 158 There is
doubt that contiguity is lost if the right of way is a mere easement, but
if the government owns the fee in the right of way property 'the contiguity
is probably destroyed.' 59
(c) Rural Property
(1) Area

Since the maximum area of land within the limits-of any incorporated city or town which may be exempt from taxation is expressly
stated to be one-half of one acre, the Supreme Court of Florida apparently
has assumed that the provision of section 1 setting the maximum of 160
acres of land applies to land located outside the limits of any incorporated
city or town, even though such designation is not expressly made in the
section. There is no reasonable objection to such an assumption.
(2) Improvements

There• is no express limitation contained in either section 7 'or
section 1 on the nature of the improvements that may be made on the
rural homestead. 'Apparently any structure or other improvement may be
made on the homestead property without affecting the right to the tax
exemption.
Op. Att'y Gen.
Since there is no limitation on the nature of the improvements
that may be made on rural homestead property, a motor court may be
located thereon, regardless of the number of buildings that may be
involved.16 0 The Attorney General has implied that only one business
154. Op.

ATT'Y GEN. 057-6 (1957).
155. 1955 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 426,
156. REP. ATT'Y GEM. 335.
157. 1935 REP. ATT'Y CEN. 71; 1935 REP. ATrT'Y GE . 35; See 1955 REP.
GEM. 355.
158. 1937 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 523; See 1955 REP. ATT'Y GE.N 355,
.159. 1955 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 355,
160. 1952 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 352; 1947 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 617.
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should be allowed on the rural homestead; otherwise, the homestead-,use
may be subordinated to the commercial use and the exemption possibly
may be lost. 1""
A person who owns property outside a municipality upon which are
located a dance hall and tourist cottages, and who eats in the dance hall
and uses one of the cottages in which to sleep and for his personal
belongings, is entitlcd to the exemption of all his property to the extent
allowable under the amendment and not merely on the part he reserves
162
as his living quarters.
(d) Urban Property
(1) Area-The language of section 7 expressly sets the maximum
limits of urban property that may be exempt as being one-half acre. The
possibility, as previously discussed, of this maximum being increased in
the case of a rural homestead being included within the incorporated
limits of a town should not be disregarded, particularly since the Attorney
General is of the opinion that the Florida constitution requires such
a procedure.
(2) Improvements-The appellate courts have had little to say
concerning the nature of the improvements on urban land insofar as the
homestead tax exemption amendment is concerned. The Supreme Court
of Florida has recognized that the amendment applies to improvements
on the land as of January 1 of the tax year,16 3 but conclusions as to the
nature of the improvements that are contemplated by the limitation
"business house of the owner" continue to be speculative in nature.
The use the property is put to by the owner probably will be determinative of whether it is a "business house." If the owner actually practices
his profession or vocation for a livelihood in the structure there is little
reason to doubt that such structure may be considered as his business
house even though it may be used for other purposes also. The validity
of this observation seems to be supported by the lack of litigation
concerning such a situation.
Doubts arise, however, when the property is rented to another; the
appellate courts of Florida have been presented no questions concerning
homestead tax exemption, the answers to which will resolve these doubts.
It is significant to note that in 1955, in the previously discussed case of
L'Engle v. Forbes,'6 the court used language that lends strength to the
position that its prior opinions concerning the nature of the improvements
on homestead property exempt from forced sale under section 1 and
161. 1952

REP. ATT'Y GEN. 352.

162. 1947 REP. ATT'Y

GEN.

619.

163. YoweU v.Rogers, 128 Fla. 881, 175 So. 772 (1937).
164. See note 58 supra and text pertaining thereto.
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devise by will under section 4 can be applied in homestead tax exemption
situations. In the L'Engle case the court was dealing with the question
of whether the property had been abandoned as homestead property and
indicated that the legislature intended to adapt to the homestead tax
exemption privilege conferred by section 7 the "rules" previously developed
by the court with respect to the homestead "character" of property
within the meaning of sections 1 and 4 of article X. Apparently, therefore,
the case law concerning questions of actual abandonment under sections 1
and 4 properly is applicable to analagous situations concerning homestead
tax exemption.
When considering whether tile language of the court in the L'Engle
case is broad enough to make applicable its "rules" concerning the
"character" of homestead property to questions involving improvements
on urban property it is necessary to recognize that the L'Engle case was
concerned with the question of whether the homeowner had by extended
absence actually abandoned property which at the time of his departure
was admittedly of homestead character. It was not concerned with the
improvements on the homestead, either as being qualified for tax exemption or as losing its character as homestead property by abandonment.
In spite of these distinguishing features the strong possibility of the
application to section 7 of the case law having to do with the nature of
the improvements on homestead property under court constructions of
sections 1 and 4 warrants its consideration.
In this area the court has faced two general types of situations
concerning the renting of property which necessitated the determination
of whether the rental property constituted the "business house of the
owner" and thus was entitled to exemption under section I or section 4.
(1) Separate Buildings- The first of these situations involved the
renting of buildings separate from the actual residence of the owner, yet
located within the maximum limits of the homestead. property, i.e., the
one half acre. In Cowdery v. Herring6 ' the Supreme Court of Florida
held that two detached buildings, separate from the residence of the
owner, consisting of a garage, used in part for storing the owner's car
but principally as the repair shop of a tenant, and a frame building used
by the owner to store flower pots and by a tenant as a sign painting
shop, constituted a portion of the homesteader's "business house" and
was exempt from forced sale. The court stressed that even though the
term '.'business house" is not defined in the constiution, it is plain that
the intent was to preserve as exempt a reasonable portion of the homestead improvements, in addition to the owner's actual residence, when
165. 106 Fla. 567, 143 So. 433 (1932), aff'd on rehearing, 106 Fla. '574, 144 So.
348 (1932).
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it appears that the improvements concerned are being used as a means
for making the owner's livelihood.
In McEwen v. Larson1 6 the court, when concerned with section 4
of article X, held that an apartment house with a detached garage built
for renting purposes is not a "business house of the owner" but at the
same time purported to distinguish Cowdery v. Herring by saying "the
owner living on her homestead merely rented for a toolhouse a small garage
that had been used as a part of the city homestead property."
In a subsequent case, O'Neal v. Miller,1a four small houses and a
fishstore, all on the homestead property and all rented to others, were
hcld not contemplated by the term "business house of the owner" in
spite of testimony that the rentals constituted the sole income of the
owner. In the concurring opinion, an attempt was made to throw some
light on the court's attitude in distinguishing the Cowdery and McEwen
cases, "In the Cowdcry case the garage and the paint shop were improvements in the form of commercial establishments, from which the owner
derived her principal means of livelihood, and such were held to constitute
a 'business house' within the intendment of the constitution. In the
McEwcn case, while it is true that the apartment house was the source
of income, such income was derived from persons who came to reside
on the property, and the apartment house and land required for its
operation and maintenance were held to have been abandoned as homestead property." O'Neal v. Miller was concerncd with the construction
of section 1 of article X.
The question again was presented to the supreme court in 1956.
In Union Trust Co. v. Glunt, 1 s involving probate proceedings, a small
one-story cottage and a two-story garage apartment, both separate and
detached from thc residence and used for rental purposes, were considered
as within the term "business house." With reference to the opposing
contentions that the case should be ruled by Cowdery v. Herring or
MeEwen v. Larson, the supreme court was of the opinion that the Cowdery
case was determinative of the present one. The court quoted with approval
from this case to the effect that even though "residence and business
house" of the owner is not defined in the constitution, still the intent of
this language is to "preserve as exempt a reasonable portion of the homestead improvements, in addition to the owner's actual residence, when
it appears that the improvements concerned are being used as a means
of making the owner's livelihood." The court stated that one's business,
trade, craft or other means by which he makes a living may have much
to do with determining what constitutes his "residence and business
166.
So. 466
167.
168.

136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866 (1939).
(1931).
143 FIa. 171, 196 So. 478 (1940).
85 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1956).

See Jordan v. Jordan, 100 Fla. 1586, 132
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house"; that it is a matter of common knowledge garage apartments are
frequently placed adjacent to the home for rental as well as utility purposes;
that the one-story cottage was a one-room affair, twelve feet wide and
twenty-six feet long and its only purpose or design was to produce a small
rental or contribution as a means of making the owner's livelihood. The
court's conclusion was that the terms "residence and business house of
the owner" and "means of making the owner's livelihood" are flexible
clauses and should be construed reasonably in light of the trade, craft
or occupation one pursues to make a living.
The reasoning of the court in this case is inconsistent with the
explanation appearing in the concurring opinion of O'Neal Y. Miller
concerning the. distinction between Cowdery v. Herring and McEwen v.
Larson, since here income was derived from persons who came to reside
on the property.
The tests that must be met ii ascertaining whether the detached
buildings are included in the term "business house" are not clear. The
court apparently emphasizes the necessity of limiting this type of property
to a "reasonable portion" of the homestead property. The care with
which the court in Union Trust Co. v. Glunt, supra, considered the size
of the buildings and the amount of the rentals accruing therefrom seemed
of great significance. The implication may be that the business use cannot
be the predominant use of the homestead property; it must be subordinate
to the use of the property as a home. On the other hand, the requirement
that the rental property actually be used for purposes of making a livelihood rather than merely a supplement to a livelihood gained by othet
means seems to imply the rental property cannot be considered as a mere
sideline and still be entitled to the exemption as a "business house" of
the owner. The court apparently is satisfied that each case must be decided
as it arises.
(2) Single Building-The second type of situation involved the
rental of a part of the building in which the homesteader resided. The
suprcme court in Smith v.Guckenheimer169 early approved the equitable
division of the building into exempt and non-exempt parts with relation
to a forced sale situation. The court expressed the opinion that in cases
where the non-exempt improvement or building is combined in a single
structure that likewise constitutes the residence or business house of the
owner, the soil perpendicularly under and covered by any non-exempt
improvement is improperly dedicated to other uses than are consistent with
the constitutional right of exemption thereof, and is, therefore, not exempt.
The court, by a perpendicular line, divided the building into exempt
and non-exempt parts and permitted the sale of the non-exempt part
under execution.
169. 42 Fla. 1, 27 So. 900 (1900).
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. Later, in Brogdon v. McBride,'70 the court seemingly held this
procedure not applicable to a situation involving a multiple unit apartment
building, the ground floor apartment being the residence of the owner,
because the building was not divisible by a penpendicular line without
destroying or eliminating a part occupied by the owner; consequently, all
the property was considered homestead property in relation to the attempt
todevise it contrary to section 4, article X of the Florida constitution.
The requirement of a perpendicular division of the exempt from
the non-exempt portions of the property, while logically applicable to
situations of forced sale or devise, in which the property often must be
divided, is of doubtful value for tax exemption purposes. Since the taxation
does not involve the necessity of dividing the building, as do forced
sale and devise, there is no reason why the property cannot be divided into
exempt and non-exempt parts even though such a division cannot be
accomplished by a perpendicular line. Such a division has been approved
by the Florida Supreme Court in tax exemption situations not involving
homesteads."1

Op. Att'y Gen.
An owner who resides and makes his permanent home on a piece
of land and also operates his business thereon, either in a separate building
or in the building used as a home, is entitled to tax exemption on all
the property to the extent allowable under the amendment .71 2 Any part
of the building not used as the home and its curtilage or the owner's
business house is not entitled to the exemption. 73 The tax assessor should
separate the uses and grant the tax exemption only as to the designated
uses.

174

Rental property located on urban homestead land is eligible for
the exemption if such property is a principal part of the means of livelihood
of the owner. The earlier view of the Attorney General was that the
tax exemption remained unaffected even though the rentals were carried
on as a sideline; 71 later, his position was changed to require the rentals
to be the principal business of the owner. 76
The rental property may be a part of the same building occupied
by the owner as his home, e.g., a hotel; 17 7 or it may be a separate
building. 78
170. 75 So. 2d 770 (1954). See Lockhart v. Sasser, 156 339, 22 So. 2d 763 (1945).
171. Simpson v. Bohon, 159 Fla. 280, 31 So. 2d 406 (1942); State v. Doss, 150
Fla. 491, 8 So. 2d 17 (1941).
172. 1952 REP. Arr'y C N. 352.
173. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 057-144 (1957).
174. 1952 Rap. ATT'Y GEN. 352.
175. 1941 REP. ATT'Y CEN. 163.
176. 1945 REP. ATT'Y GN. 281.
177. Ibid.
178. 1952 RaP. ATT'Y GEN. 352.
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If an owner lives in and operates a motor court consisting of several
buildings within a municipality, he is entitled to an exemption of the
building in which he lives and one other building as his business house.
t 79
The remaining buildings are not entitled to tax exemption.
A garage or a garage apartment which are rental properties may
be included as a part of the homestead for exemption purposes unless
they are of sufficient size to have the use of them as rental property be
dcemcd a predominant rather than a subordinate use of the homestead
property. 5 0
MAXIMUM ExEMPTION

(a) Assessed Valuation - Since the exemption may be claimed "up
to the assessed valuation of five thousand dollars" the following observations apparently have a valid basis: (1) if the assessed valuation of the
property is less than five thousand dollars the entire value of the property
will be the basis of the excmption; (2) if the assessed valuation of the
propcrty is less than five thousand dollars, the difference between the
assessed valuation and $5,000.00 cannot be transferred for the purpose of
obtaining tax exemption on other property, since the amendment is concerned only with tax exemption of homesteads as defined in the constitution;
(3) If the assessed valuation of the property exceeds five thousand dollars
a real property tax may be levied with reference to the excess; (4) Since
the method of assessing real property is largely subjective in nature, the
assessed valuation probably will vary from the full cash value, which is
the statutory basis for real property tax assessments in Florida, sa To
the extent that this is true the owner of the property may either pay
taxes which lie should not be required to pay or he may be exempt from
payment of taxes which he should be required to pay. The charge is often
made that in some counties in Florida the property is not assessed at
more than fifty percent of its full cash value. If this is true in a given
situation it is significant to note that the owner of a homestead the full
cash value of which is $10,000.00 would be required to pay no ad valorem
tax on the homestead, in the absence of special assessments or contractual
obligations, incurred prior to the effective date of the amendment, for
the retireent of which special assessmcnts or obligations the property
is bound to be taxed.
(b) One Dwelling House-The maximum limit of the exemption
for any one dwelling house is stated to be $5,000.000. Accordingly, the
scope of the term "dwelling house" assumnes importance.

179. Ibid.

180. 1952 REp. AI,TY GI:N. 352.
180a. FLA. STAT. § 193,11 (1957).
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In Overstreet v. Tubin81 1 a duplex apartment, each side being owned
separately, was held by the Florida Supreme Court to be one dwelling
house. Consequently, each resident owner was entitled to a maximum
exemption of $2,500.00.
The court was impressed with the benevolence the people of Florida
had extended the homesteader but was more impressed with the fact
that the exemption in operation substantially reduced a prolific source of
tax revenue for local government.
The canon of statutory construction upon which the decision was
based requires that tax exemption statutes be strictly construed against
the claimant. Doubts, under such a construction, are resolved in favor
of the government. A doubt that each apartment of a duplex is a single
dwelling house seems, in the main, to be assumed by the court. The
only aid directly on this issue was a Mississippi statute which provided
that the duplex should be considered as a single dwelling, but the court
admitted that it was not bound by such a statute.
The major portion of the opinion consists of a discussion of the
ultimate in benevolence shown by the people, the obligation of the
homesteader to pay his fair share of taxes, the comparative treatment of
homesteads for other purposes in other states, and the potential danger
of ingenious planning and building of homes on a small area resulting
in additional loss of tax revenues.
The reason why the court considered it necessary to dwell at length
on these facts is not clear. Certainly they do not establish the meaning
of the term "one dwelling house" as including each side of a duplex
apartment house where each apartment is separately owned. The court
evidently considered the ominous financial future of local government
which would be produced as a result of a contrary decision as justifying
its attitude. Apparently this decision can be taken as authority for
limiting to $5,000.00 the exemption on all multiple dwellings.
While one may agree that the loss of tax revenue from such a
source as homesteads is deplorable, such sentiment is hardly a justification
for a decision which probably would shock all laymen and many lawyers.
(c) Joint Ownership - Ownership by the entireties, jointly or in
common with others does not defeat the exemption. It may be apportioned
among the owners who "reside thereon as their respective interests shall
appear, but no such exemption of more than five thousand dollars shall
be allowed to any one person, and the amount of the exemption allowed
any person cannot exceed the proportionate assessed valuation based on
the interest owned by such person."
181. 53 So.2d 913 (Fla. 1951).
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(1) Single Dwelling- It is apparent that, in order to be entitled to
the exemption, each joint owner must be otherwise qualified, i.e., he or
she must reside on the property and in good faith make it his or her
permanent home. It also seems that if a legal or natural dependent of
the joint owner makes the property his or her permanent home exemption
may be claimed.
It follows, therefore, that if two persons are joint owners of a single
dwelling house in equal proportions and both reside in the house, the
house being assessed at a value of $5,000.00, the entire property will be
exempt from taxation, if proper application is made and no special
assessment or contractual obligation binding the land to be taxed is involved.
Each joint owner would be entitled to an exemption of $2,500.00, since
the section limits the total exemption of any one dwelling house to
$5,000.00.
If the permanent home of the two joint owners, each owning an
undivided one-half interest, is assessed at $10,000.00, the maximum exemption to which each owner is entitled is more questionable. A maximum
of $5,000.00 on each dwelling house is specified in the section, yet there
is also a provision to the effect that a joint owner's exemption cannot
exceed the proportionate assessed valuation based on the interest he owns.
If the term "assessed valuation" in this situation is construed to mean
$10,000.00 then each joint owner would be entitled to an exemption of
$5,000.00; on the other hand, if the assessed valuation is considered to
have a maximum limit of $5,000.00 regardless of the actual assessed valuation, each owner would be entitled to an exemption of only $2,500.00.
The attitude of the Supreme Court of Florida in Overstreet v. Tubin' 82
involving the duplex apartment situation, although not concerned with
joint ownership, may be indicative of the feeling on the part of the court
that if only one dwelling house is involved this fact shall be determinative
of the maximum exemption allowable regardless of joint ownership.
Even so, the joint owner whose interest in the property is represented
by an assessed valuation of $5,000.00 or more may contend that he has
an interest in his home which should be protected to the extent of the
$5,000.00 exemption and by allowing him the exemption there would be
no violation of the maximum limitation of $5,000.00 on one dwelling house.
The fallacy in such a contention is apparent by assuming a situation involving a valuable homestead in which each joint owner's interest is represented
by an assessed valuation of $5,000.00 or more. Obviously, each could not
validly make this contention concerning the same dwelling house.
The same result is accomplished by construing the term "assessed
valuation" in the clause "nor shall the amount of the exemption allowed
182. See note 181 sumra and text pertaining thereto.
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any person exceed the proportionate assessed valuation based on the
interest owned by such person" as meaning the assessed valuation" not in
excess of $5,000.00.
(2) Multiple Dwelling-The reasoning concerning the amount of
exemption allowable to each joint owner of a single dwelling would, no
doubt,-apply to joint owners of a multiple dwelling, since in Overstreet Y.
Tubin8 3 the court considered the multiple dwelling as a single dwelling
house for taxation purposes.
It is doubtful that if the ownership of the duplex apartment in the
Tubin case had been joint rather than each unit separately. owned the
result would have been different. As long as the court considers a. multiple
dwelling as one dwelling house for homestead tax exemption purposes
and maintains its present reluctance to decrease potential sources of tax
revenue, the fact that such multiple dwelling is jointly owned will not
serve to increase the aggregate exemption.
Op. Att'y Gen.- More than one owner can claim the exemption on
same
property, but no such exemption of more than $5,000.00 shall
the
.be allowed to any one person or any one dwelling house and it is not
necessary for the interest of each partial owner to be separately assessed on
the tax roll.' 84 Only the partial owners in a single dwelling who reside
on the property are entitled to the exemption each in an amount not to
exceed the proportionate assessed valuation based on his interest; if there
-is more than one person, the total exemption cannot exceed $5,000.00.183
Although a tenancy by the entirety may not be severed even for tax
Iiirposes, a joint tenancy can be severed for tax purposes as well as other
purposes; consequently, the joint tenant who lives on the property is
entitled to an exemption based on his interest in the property. 8 6
(3) Several Dwellings-If the homestead property is owned jointly
or in common with others and each of the owners occupies a separate
dwelling house located thereon as his permanent home, the determination
of the maximum amount of the exemption becomes more complicated.
Is each joint owner entitled to only his proportionate share of the
*assessed valuation up to a maximum of $5,000.00 as an exemption, or is he
entitled to his proportionate share of the actual assessed valuation even
though it is in excess of $5,000.00, provided there is no violation of the
provision whereby no person can receive more than $5,000.00 as an
exemption?
It seems reasonable to assume that the maximum limitation of
$5,000.00 as an exemption on any one dwelling house does not mean that
183. Ibid.
184.

1939 REP. ATTrY CEG.

185. Ibid.
186. 1955 REP.

438; 1939

ATT'v GEN. 411.

REP. ATT'Y CEN.

444.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIII

the term "dwelling house" is synonymous with "homestead" in all cases.
Why should the amendment be construed to penalize joint ownership of
several houses when each house is the permanent home of one of the
joint ownrs or his legal or natural dependent?

While it is true that the joint owner can claim an exemption based
only on the interest lie owns, still this interest may represent an assessed
valuation of $5,000.00 or more. Certainly, such an interest should be
exempt from taxation to the same extent that would be true if the joint
ownership was severed and each former joint owner held title to his
dwelling house individually. The reasoning of the court in Overstreet v'.
Tubin8 7 which stressed the owner's obligation to pay his fair share of the
cost of his government is even more difficult to apply here than in the
situation of the duplex apartment. Once the people of the state bind
the government to exempt homesteads from taxation, this obligation should
be fulfilled.
Op. Att'y Gen.-Partial owners must reside on their property to
be entitled to any homestead tax exemption therefor; the total exemption
to all cannot exceed $5,000.00 on any one dwelling house and the amount
of such exemption is to be determined so that the same shall not exceed
the proportionate assessed valuation based on the interest owned by such
person.'"8

Since the aniendnment limits the exemption to the value of the
interest of the homesteader, when the homesteader's interest is a life estate
there remains another valuable interest in the real estate, viz., the ie-

mainder or reversion.I' The latter is subject to taxation. 9 0 Such
interest can be separately valucd. The value of the life estate on
particular day depends upon the value of the property measured by
life expectancy of the life tenant. 1 .
When partners hold title to a tract of land in the nahmes of all

an
any
the
the

partners, in the names of some of the partners, or in the name of a third

party and there are located upon the land several dwellings which are
occupied separately by the partners, each partner nay claim an area for
exemption up to the maximum1 of a homestead as defined in section 1,
article X of the Florida constitution, since a partner is equitable owner
and a tenant in conmon with other partners. 92- 'he amount of tile
exemption to which each partner is entitled, however, is measured by his
interest in the property and since the value of the homestead for tax
exemption purposes is limited to $5,000.00 his exemption cannot exceed
187. See note 180 supra and text pertaining thereto.
188.
189.
190.
191.

1939
1953
ibid.
1954
192. 1947

REP. ATT'Y CEN. 438.
REP. ATT'Y GCI-. 314.
R-P. ATT'Y CiEN. 210.
REP, Ar-y GFN. 617.
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his share of this amount measured by his proportionate interest in the
property.'"
Where two tenants in common, each possessed of an undivided interest
in the property, own a parcel of real estate, and occupy separate buildings
thereon and make the same their permanent homes, each is entitled to
a homestead tax execption on his interest, which is one-half interest.' 9'
Each tenant in common holds only an undivided interest in the land
occupied. Only his interest can be exempt. If the other tenant does not
occupy the land his interest cannot be exempt. The fact that they occupy
separate dwellings does not alter their interest in the land, which is the
subject of the exemption. 1 '
Where the owner of a parcel of real property conveys it to another,
retaining a life estate in an undivided one-half interest therein, and each
of such parties makes his permanent home in separate dwelling houses
located upon the said property each is entitled to an exemption based
upon the nature of his interest, i.e., the grantee of the undivided one-half
interest is entitled to the exemption on the lands to the extent of his
separate occupancy of said undivided one-half interest; the 'life tenant is
entitled to exemption on the undivided one-half interest of which he is
possessed but only to the extent of the value of the life estate; the value
of the remainder is subject to taxation. 9 6 There cannot be two occupancies
of the same lands by two or more persons where there are separate dwelling
houses occupied by each. Two or more persons may jointly occupy one
dwelling house and be entitled to an exemption on the same building, to
the extent of their interests so long as not more than $5,000.00 total
exemption is allowed on one house; but there may not be such a joint
occupancy for purposes of homestead tax exemption, in two or more
dwelling houses.'9 7
The 1938 homestead tax exemption amendment does not prohibit the
$500.00 exemption allowable to a widow or a disabled person under
section 9, article IX of the constitution of Florida from being applied to a
homestead. 98
(4) The Widow
The provision in the amendment whereby a joint owner and an
owner in common with others cannot be granted an exemption in excess
of the proportionate assessed valuation based on the interest owner by
such a person poses a troublesome question when the occupant of the
homestead is a life tenant, particularly if the life tenant is a widow.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Ibid.
1955
Ibid.
1955
Ibid.

REP. ATT'Y GEN. 113.
REP. ATT'Y GEN.

113.

198.. 1946 REP. ArT'Y GEN. 776.
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If the term "jointly or in common with others" is construed to
include a life tenant together with the remainderman the question of the
value of the life tenancy in connection with the land will arise regardless
of whether the term "assessed valuation" is considered to have a ceiling
of $5,000.00 or not. It is apparent that the value of the tenancy would
diminish each year the tenant made the property his or her permanent
home.
It may be of significance to note that in the rare situations in which
the legislature of Florida took the trouble to designate specific interests
which should be included as either legal or equitable in the construction
of the tax exemption amendment, "a widow residing on real estate by
virtue of dower or other estates therein limited in time by deed, will,
jointure, or settlement" was paid particular deference. It should be noted,
further, that even a tenancy for a term of years is sufficient to qualify
the resident widow. Such a tenancy probably would qualify no one else
in the absence of a statute, since a tenancy for a term of years is not
considered as an interest in the real property.
Since the value of a life tenancy or a tenancy for a particular term
would be comparatively small in relation to the value of the remainder,
which probably could not be the basis for a claim for the exemption since
it is subject to the tenancy, the exemption that could be claimed by the
tenant apparently would amount to very little and would become even
smaller as the tenancy was extended. Accordingly, there is a doubt that
an appellate court in Florida will construe the tax exemption amendment
in such a manner as to jeopardize the granting of the full exemption to
the widow if the assessed value of the homestead in which she is making
her permanent home by virtue of her tenancy is $5,000.00 or above.
This position seems even stronger in the situation of a widow who
receives a life estate by virtue of a constitutional provision, such as the
life estate she receives through the operation of section 4, article X of
the constitution of Florida when she and children survive her husband
whose death terminates his sole ownership of a homestead.
PROCEDURE

The amendment provides that the legislature may prescribe appropriate and reasonable laws regulating the manner of establishing the right
to the exemption. The legislature has exercised this authority upon
several occasions.
Op. Att'y Gen.
The homestead tax exemption amendment is self-executing, requiring
no statute to entitle a qualified person to the exemption. A constitutional
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provision does not lose its self-executing quality merely because it provides
that the legislature shall by appropriate legislation provide for carrying
it into effect. ""
(a) The Application - Each taxpayer who claims the exemption is
required to file a statutory form with the county tax assessor of the county
in which the property is located on or before April 1st of each year.2M
20 1
Failure to do so will constitute a waiver of the exemption for that year.
The filing of the request for exemption with the county tax assessor is
deemed also to be application for the exemption from the Municipality
in which the homestead is located.2 0 2 It is the duty of tax assessors of municipalities in Florida to obtain a copy of each application for the exemption
on file in the office of, and approved by, the county assessor of the county
in which such municipality is located and it is the duty of the county tax
assessors to furnish such copies to the municipal tax assessors in their
respective counties upon request.20 3 City tax assessor are governed by the
laws relating to the homestead tax exemption amendment. 20 4
Some doubt has been cast on the written request'as being an absolute
requirement for the exemption. The Florida Supreme Court upon one
occasion stated, 205 "Although we do not decide it here, it is doubtful if
the taxing authorities can deny homestead exemption to one otherwise
qualified for it upon failures to file written requests therefor or to fill out
the complicated forms now in use by such authorities."
A statutory exception to the requirement that each taxpayer who
claims the exemption shall file the request is made in the case of persons
serving in any branch of the armed forces of the United States. Such
persons may file a claim for the exemption, either in person or if by reason
of such service he is unable to file the claim in person he may file it
through his or her next of kin or through any other person he or she
20 6
authorizes in writing to file the claim.
The application for tax exemption need not be made under oath, but
whoever makes or subscribes an application knowing or having reason to
know .that it is false as to any material matter therein, shall be guilty of
20 7
a misdemeanor.
199. 1939 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 438, 442.
200. FLA. STAT. § 192.16 (1957).
201. Ibid. This statute provides that in counties of a population exceeding 27,500
the assessor is required to give the applicant a receipt for the application and this receipt
constitutes conclusive proof of the timely filing of the application. As a matter of
practice many county tax assessors issue receipts acknowledging the application.
202. FLA. STAT. § 167.72 (1957).
203. Ibid.
204. FLA. STAT. § 192.18 (1957).
205. City of Jacksonville v. Bailey, 159 Fla. 11, 30 So. 2d 529 (1947).
206. FLA. STAT. § 192.161 (1957).
207. FLA. STAT. § 192.57 (1957); this statute passed in 1943, seemingly changed
the law since an oath apparently was required previously. See FLA. STAT. § 192.15
(1935).
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Op. AIt'y Gen,
The homeowner should file his application for the exemption on or
before April 1 of the year for which the exemption is requested..2 0 8

Late

filing may possibly be justified under exceptional circumstances, to be
determined as they arise? 09 The April 1 deadline cannot be extended,
even by the board of county commissioners, except in those rare instances
in which waiver by the party entitled to the exemption is impossible, such

2
as an insane person.

10

The use of the present tense in the statutory form for making
application, contained in Florida Statutes, section 192.15, does not shift
the date as of which the right to the exemption is fixed from January 1
to any date on or before April 1 that the claimant happens to select for
filing. 2 ''

An application which is refiled after being voluntarily withdrawn by
the owner is valid and the exemption may be granted if the applicant is
otherwise qualified. 2' 2 No Florida statute expressly requires title papers of
the applicant to b of record in the county, although as a matter of
practice some county tax assessors make this a requirement. 213If the owner of property on which a homestead exemption could
have been claimed dies without having filed the claim, and lineal
descendants survive, the personal representative of the owner has no
jurisdiction over the property and thus is not entitled to claim the
exemption, 21 ' but if the situation is such that, under the law, the homestead is considered as a part of the estate the personal representative
may make the application." 5
The application cannot be filed by a person who purchases the
property after January 1st. 228 There apparently is an exception to this
requirement, however, with relation to exemptions from municipal taxes
in some situations. If the tax year of a city begins July 1st, a person who
becomes a homeowner after January 1st but before July 1st may make
proper application for the exemption to the city tax assessor .21 Although
the municipal tax assessor is required to obtain copies of the homestead
exemption claims filed with the county tax assessor, he is not precluded
from examining them and ascertaining whether the exemption status of
208. 1939 REP. A
209. 1946

CGEN. 448.

Ayr'y GEN. 287; 1939 REP. ATT'y GEN. 448.
210. 1946 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 287.
REP.

211. 1945 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 288.

212. 1951 REP. ATT'Y GE:N. 350.
213. 1954 REP. An'y G .N. 210;

214. 1946 REP. Anj-Cy OiEN. 283.
215. 1946 REP. A'rT'y Gl N. 282.
216. 1954 REP. ATT'Y OEN. 217.
217. 1953

REP.

AIT'Y GN. 220.

1953 RFP. ATT'Y

ON.

220.
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"
January 1st still continues on the following July 1st.2 18
A person, therefore, who is not qualified for the exemption from county taxes on
January 1st may be qualified for exemption from city taxes by the determinative date in a particular city.2 19 This date was July 1st in the particular
city with regard to which the opinion was rendered, but any date varying
from January 1st which is recognized by the city presumably would be
subject to this opinion.
When some of the partners in a partnership wish to claim the
exemption on partnership property the consent of the remaining partners
0
to the application probably should be required. 22

A person who makes a false affidavit for the purpose of claiming
the cxemption is guilty of a misdemeanor under section 192.16(3) of the
Florida Statutes rather than a felony under section 837.01 dealing with
perjury, and whoever knowingly aids, abets, counsels or otherwise procures
another to make such an affidavit is guilty of a misdemeanor under
section 776.011, whereby he is a principal in the first degree, and section
192.16(3) which denounces the crime and provides the penalty.2 2 '
If a husband resides with his wife in a home in one county and
properly files application for exemption in such county, and his wife,
who owns realty in another county but does not permanently reside
thereon, makes application for exemption in that county, the application
of the husband may not be denied on ground of fraud since there is no
fraud in his application?.22 2
A person may claim the exemption in a county other than that in which
he is registered as a qualified elector at all elections under the state constitution, provided there is a legal reason for distinguishing between the separate voting residence and the residence for hometead tax exemption
pu rposes."222a

(b) Original Jurisdiction to Grant Exemption
The tax assessor of the county and the tax assessor of the municipality
are empowered to make the first decisions relative to granting or refusing
the requests for tax exemption in the jurisdictions they serve.223 They are
required to allow the exemption if the request is found to be in accordance
with the law and to make such entries upon the tax roll as are necessary
to allow the exemption to the applicant..22 4
218.
219.
220.
221.

Ibid.
Ibid.

1947 REP. AIr'Y GE,. 617.

Op. ATT'Y GEN. 058-78 (1958).
222. 1955 REP, ATT'Y GEN. 194.

222a. Op. AT'r'Y GEN. 058-124 (1958).
223. FIL.

224. Ibid.

STAT.

§ 192.19 (1957).
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The examination of the applications by the tax assessor is required
to be made as soon as practical after the first day of April. of the current
year and prior to the first Monday in May.225 Apparently, neither the
county nor the city tax assessor is bound by the decision of the other,
in spite of the reference in the statute requiring the city assessors to
obtain the applications filed with "and approved by" the county tax
assessors.
If, after due consideration, the tax assessor should find the applicant
not to be entitled under the law to the exemption, the assessor is required
to deliver to the applicant in person or by registered mail a form of
notice of disapproval containing the reasons for the disapproval. 22 6
Op. Att'y Gei.-The tax assessor is, in the first instance, the judge
of the sufficiency of the evidence concerning whether the applicant has
27
established a permanent home on the property.
The city tax assessor is not bound by the decision of the county tax
assessor concerning the application for the exemption. He may exercise
228
his independent judgment.
An assessor can correct clerical errors of extension on a tax roll
after allowing the exemption, and may grant the exemption after first
denying it and failing to notify the claimant; but notice of denial constitutes
an automatic appeal and prevents further changes by him. 229 An assessor
who discovers his mistake of granting an exemption may give notice to
the applicant and reject the application. He subsequently, after a hearing
is afforded the applicant, may cause the tax roll to be corrected as authorized by Florida Statutes section 192.21.280
(c) Administrative Appeal
If the tax assessor of the county refuses the application for tax
exemption he is required to file in the office of the clerk of the board of
county commissioners the original of the notice of disapproval with entry
of service upon the applicant. The filing of this notice constitutes an
appeal of the applicant from the decision of the tax assessor to the board
31
of county commissioners, when sitting as a board of tax equalization
This board is required to review the case and shall review the application
and evidence presented to the tax assessor upon which the applicant
based his claim for exemption and shall hear the applicant in person or
by agent. The board may affirm or reverse the decision of the tax
225. Ibid.

226. FLA. STAT. § 192.19 (1957).
227. 1951 REP. Ar' GEN. 350.
228. 1951 REP. Ar'y GEN. 261; 1943 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 199.
229. 1938 REP. Arr'y GEN. 524.
230. 1952 REP. ATT'Y GEN. 286.

231.

FLA. STAr.

§ 192.19 (1957).
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assessor.2 32 The applicant is not required to personally make application
for the hearing or appear in person or by agent before the assessor or
33
board in order to have his case reviewed2
Appeals from the decision of a city tax assessor are not expressly
covered in the statutes. Presumably the governing body of the city would
be the proper appellate body and, in practice, this is done, although from
a technical standpoint the county commission may be considered as the
only administrative appellate body.
Op. Att'y Gen.-The applicant whose application for exemption
has been refused by the tax assessor need not appear in person or by agent
before the board of county commissioners in order to have such board
review the assessor's action, since the review is made mandatory on the
234
part of the board.
After the county tax roll has been completed, equalized, extended,
approved and delivered to the tax collector no additional homestead
benefits may be granted except such as may be corrections of omissions
and commissions of the taxing officials.2 35 The county commission's power
as a board of equalization has ceased upon its adjournment. 23 However,
in case the assessor- makes a mistake in granting an exemption, gives
notice of the mistake to the applicant and also notice of rejection, the
applicant is entitled to a hearing even though the tax roils are in the
hands of the tax collector 2 37
(d) Judicial .Appeal -The action of the board of county commissioners sitting as a board of tax equalization is final unless the applicant
shall within 15 days from the date of refusal of the application file in
the circuit court of the county in which the homestead is situated a
proceeding against the assessor for a declaratory decree or initiate other
proceedings seeking to establish his right to the exemption.238
Op. At'y Gen.-The county tax assessor may contest in the circuit
court an alteration of his assessment by the county commissioners that
he deems incorrect. The Florida statute section 192.19 providing that the
decision of the board of county commissioners sitting as a board of tax
equalization is final does not apply to the tax assessor in such a situation. 238
CONCLUSION

The practical position to be taken with regard to the homestead tax
exemption provision of the constitution is to regard it as a fixture for this
232. Ibid.
233. Ibid.

234. 1947
235. 1955

REP. ATT'Y GEN.
REP. ATT'Y GEN.

237. 1.952
238. FLA.
239. 1943

REP. ATT'Y GEN. 286.
SrAT. § 192.19 (1957).
REP. ATT'Y GEN. 198.

236. Ibid.

194.
339.
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generation at least. Constructive thinking and action concerning it should
be directed toward improving its administration and keeping it within its
present limits. To argue that a homestead should bear its fair share of taxes,
that the present exemption will always be unfair in its administration, and
that it causes an unjust shifting of the burden of local taxation may be
logical, but at this time is purely academic. A tax exemption of this type
has an inherent appeal for the public and once it becomes a part of the
organic law of a state nothing short of an economic upheaval will uproot it.
Consequently, the following discussion is offered with the thought of improving the administration of what we have rather than advocating a basic
change in the constitution,
Sonic of the language of section 7 is vague. It should be clarified.
The most expeditious and practical way for this to be done lies with the
legislature. Under the constitution, appropriate and reasonable legislation is
authorized for regulating the manner of establishing the right to the
exemption. This authorization apparently is not limited to the pasage of
statutes dealing with the mere mechanics of application, decision, and
appeal. The Florida Supreme Court has approved of the statute by which
the Legislature provided that continuous physical residence was not necessary
iu order for a person to be considered a permanent resident. This type
of statute is helpful in the construction of the amendment.
Of course, the legislature must stay within its constitutional limits
when dealing with this subject, as it discovered when the statute requiring
one year's residence as a pre-requisitc for the exemption was declared
unconstitutional. The fact remains, however, that there is a fertile area
for carefully considered legislation which can be exceedingly beneficial
in the proper construction of the amendment.
A clearly worded legislative conception of the meaning of the terms

"natural dependent," "abandonment," "dwelling house," and "assessed
valuation" would be advantageous in the administration of the amendment. The rights of joint owners, particularly life tenants, should be
clarified. Definite requirements for proving an intent to return to the
homestead in case of temporary absence should be established. Legislative
attention should also be directed to determining whether the permanent
home of a legal or natural dependent in Florida can qualify, for the
exemption, an owner who resides permanently in another state.
Uniformity is sadly lacking in the administration of the amendment.
As long as the present system of assessment of taxes is followed in Florida
there can be no uniforinitv in its administration. Criteria for assessments

vary so widely in the cities and counties throughout Florida that some
home owners are bound to benefit more than others even though their
homesteads actually are of the same value. A tax commission with the
authority to correct inequities in tax assessments and supervise the granting
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of tax exemptions probably is not the complete answer, but the creation
of such a body would be a step in the right direction.
Until these legislative steps are forthcoming, and even subsequent
thereto, the appellate courts of Florida should assume the responsibility of
clarifying the amendment at every opportunity. To forego the opportunity
to do this as was done in McCullough v. Forbes engenders confusion and
adds nothing to the prestige of the court. Once the court determines
to exercise its prerogative of construction, however, care should be taken
to consider the tax exemption amendment in the light of what it is
reasonable to assume the legislature and the people had in mind in the
process of adding it to the constitution. in Overstreet v. Tubin concerning
the duplex apartment the Court seemed to exhibit an attitude characteristic
of paternalism toward an irresponsible people, rather than a desire to
determine the true intent underlying the adoption of the amendment.
The wisdom of legislation should continue to be determined only by the
people and their authorized representa.tives.

